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CONTINUANCES FOR ATTORNEY-LEGISLATORS
As a matter of public policy certain privileges and immunities are
granted to members of legislative bodies either by constitutions1 or
statutes. 2 Among the statutory privileges given in some jurisdictions is
the right to have a case continued when one of the attorneys in the
case is a member of the legislature and the case is to be heard during
legislative session. Various reasons3 have been given for such statutes,
but the primary purpose seems to be to enable practicing attorneys to
serve in the legislature. The desirability of the statutes must be balanced with the public policy in favor of speedy and certain administrations of justice, undelayed by the absence of attorneys.
The constitutionality of a statute granting a continuance to an
attorney-legislator was questioned in the recent case of Granai v. Witters, Longmoore, Akley & Brown.4 The petitioner sought a writ of
prohibition from the Supreme Court of Vermont to restrain the hearing and disposition of two divorce suits pending in a trial court. The
petitioner had appeared as attorney of record on May 2, 1963, when
he requested a continuance of the hearings, which had been set for
May 6. As ground for the continuance the petitioner relied on a Vermont statute,5 which prohibited hearing or trying a civil case in
which a member or official of the General Assembly is a party or
attorney of record during a session of the General Assembly, unless
the privilege is waived in writing by the party or attorney. In the
"E.g., Freedom from arrest: U.S. Const. art. I, § 6; Cal. Const. art. 4, § I':
Mich. Const. art. 5, § 8; N.J. Const. art. 4, § 4, par. 9; Protection of persons and
estates: S.C. Const. art. 3, § 14; Provision for protest: Ala. Const. art. 4, § 55.
3E.g., Freedom from arrest or imprisonment: Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-401 (19 4t);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2331.11 (Baldwin 1958); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 3577 (x958);
Privilege for words spoken or written: Va. Code Ann. § 3o-9 (Repl. Vol. 1964);
Privilege not to be disturbed or intimidated: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 218.540 (1961).
3Among the reasons given are (1) the desirability of having legislators give
their undivided attention to legislative matters, Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 48 Cal.
2d 710, 312 P.2d 1098 (1957); Brooks v. Pan. Am. Loan Co., 65 So. 2d 481 (Fla.
1953); State ex rel. Johnson v. Independent School Dist., 260 Minn. 237, lo9 N.V.2d

596 (1g61); (2) the desirability of having attorneys give full attention to their
clients, Bottoms v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 764, 256 Pac. 422 (Dist. Ct. App.
1927); (3) the prevention of miscarriage of justice where an attorney's presence is
necessary for a fair and proper trial, Johnson v. Theodoron, 324 Ill. 543, 155 N.E.
481 (1927); Kyger v. Koerper, 355 Mo. 772, 774, 207 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1947); (4) the

prevention of embarrassment and conflict to legislators in the performance of
public and private duties, Hudgins v. Hall, 183 Va. 577, 3 S.E.2d 715 (1945); and
(5) the protection of the business interests of attorneys, thereby encouraging them
to serve in the legislature, State v. Myers, 352 Mo. 735, 179 S.W.2d 72 (1944).
'123 Vt. 468, 194 A.2d 391 (1963).

Wt. Stat. Ann. tit 12 § 1902 (1958).
6There was no waiver of the privilege by the petitioner-legislator in this case.
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Supreme Court the opposing party made a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the statute denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution7 and interfered with the prompt,
impartial, administration of justice required of the courts under the
Vermont Constitution.8 The motion was granted.
In dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition, the Supreme
Court of Vermont listed the relevant constitutional guarantees which
appeared in the Vermont Constitution: 9 (i) the separation of powers
into legislative, executive and judicial departments;' 0 (2) the restriction that the legislative department not infringe on any part of the
constitution;" and (3) the mandate that the courts promptly and impartially administer justice.' 2 The court emphasized that "To grant a
continuance of cases is a discretionary matter on the part of the
courts of this state."' 3 It concluded that the statute was unconstitutional in that it infringed upon processes delegated to the judiciary,
and by restricting the judicial processes, resulted in an unreasonable
deprivation of rights guaranteed to litigants.
The fundamental rule running throughout the subject of continuances is that the granting or refusal of a continuance is a matter
of judicial discretion.1 4 However, the right to continuances is now
largely regulated by statute. The general provisions of these statutes
are the same, and follow the practices that have grown up independent of the legislation.' 5 At common law, attendance on sessions of
a legislative body was not a ground for granting continuances as a
matter of right. 16 Consequently, legislatures have passed statutes making it a ground.' 7 Under some statutes the granting is mandatory' s
'US. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Vt. Const. ch. II, § 28.
"There was no occasion to pass upon the federal question in this case.
"'-Nt. Const. ch. II, § 5.
uXVt. Const. ch. II, § 6.
-Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 28.
1194 A.od at 392.

"'See cases collected at 12 Am. Jur. Continuances § 5, n.i6 (1938).
"Annot., 74 Am. Dec. 141 (1886).
"'Johnson v. Theodoron, 324 Ill. 543, 155 N.E. 481 (1927).
"Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 24-40-020, 24-40-030 (1962); Ark. Stat. § 27-1401
(1962); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1o54; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 54.08 (1941); Ga. Code Ann. §
81-1402 (1956); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 101.14 (Smith-Hurd 1956); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 2-1302 (Supp. 1963); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46-125, 126, 127 (1948); La. Rev. Stat.
§ 13:4163 (1950); Md. Ann. Code art. 75, § 24 (1957); Minn. State. Ann. § 3.16 (1961);
Miss. Code Ann. 1649.5 (Supp. 1962); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.120 (1959); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 1.310 (1961); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2168a (1948); Va. Code Ann. § 3o-5
(Repl. Vol. 1964); W. Va. Code Ann. § 234a (1962); Wis. Stat. § 256.13 (196).

"E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 54.08 (1941); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2168a (1948); Va.
Code Ann. § 3o-5 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
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while under others the courts are allowed some discretion. 19 In a few
jurisdictions the courts have been faced with constitutional objections
20
to these statutes.
At least three jurisdictions hold that statutes giving an automatic
continuance to attorney-legislators during sessions of the legislature
are constitutional. 21 Texas appears to have taken the most extreme position in this area. In King v. State22 the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas23 upheld the Texas statute24 notwithstanding the fact that
there was evidence supporting a finding of abuse of the privilege
granted under the statute. The decision extends the holding of the
Superior Court of Texas in Mora v. Ferguson,25 in which the statute
was upheld as against a contention that it added to the privileges and
immunities given members of the Legislature by express constitutional
provision. The language of the Texas statute is clear, "It is hereby declared to be the intention of the Legislature that the provisions of
this section shall be deemed mandatory and not discretionary. ' 2 The
court emphasized that such legislation was necessary to protect the
practice of the lawyer, particularly when one considers the meager
compensation paid legislators. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the public interest in having people from all walks of life
serve in the legislature.
Virginia and Florida maintain that the mandatory continuance
statues are consistent with the constitutional provision for separation
of powers. In Hudgins v. Hall27 the Supreme Court of Appeals of
'E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 11o, § 101.14 (Smith-Hurd 1956); Mo. Rev. Stat.

§

510.120 (1959).
3"McConnell v. State, 227 Ark. 988, 302 S.V.2d 8o5 (1957); Brooks v. Pan. Am.

Loan Co., 65 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1953); Johnson v. Theodoron, 324 Ill. 543, 155 N.E. 481

(1927); Kyger v. Koerper, 355 Mo. 772, 774, 207 S.V.2d 46, 48 (947); Booze v. District
Court, 365 P.2d 589 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); Mora v. Ferguson, 145 Tex. 498,
199 S.W.2d 759 (1947); Hudgins v. Hall, 183 Va. 577, 32 S.E.2d 715 (1945).
2Texas, Virginia, Florida.
"s6o Tex. Crim. 556, 273 S.V.2d

72

(1954).

2In regard to continuances for legislators, almost no distinction has been made,
to date, between civil and criminal actions either in the cases or in the statutes. In
light of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial it would seem that some
distinction might be made between the two. It is interesting to note that Alaska
has provided separate statutes for civil and criminal actions. The criminal statute
has been worded-"is entitled to a reasonable continuance." Alaska Comp. Laws
Ann. § 24-40-020 (1962). Compare with this Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §
which is a civil statute.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 216a (1948).
V145 Tex. 498, 199 S.W.2d 759 (1947).
nSupra note 24.
183 Va. 577, 32 S.E.2d 715 (1945).

24-40-030
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Virginia said, "The legislature is a co-ordinate branch of the State
government. It may well determine what conditions will best enable
its membership to perform their official duties and private responsibilities while engaged in public service." 28 In regard to the nature and
purpose of the statute29 the court said, "It is a peremptory statute, designed the prevent embarrassment and conflict to a member of the
General Assembly in the performance of his public and private du30
ties."
As to the justification for legislative action the Supreme Court
of Florida in Brooks v. Pan Am. Loan Co. 3a took the same position
as the Virginia court. It further concluded that the automatic continuance statute32 was not only reasonable but necessary to the proper
functioning of the Legislature. Reasonableness is affected by the
frequency and length of legislative sessions. In Florida the Legislature
meets every two years for a sixty-day session.33 The court also felt
that continuances were necessary to protect legislators who are sole
practitioners. In addition Florida has a constitutional provision
which recognizes the power of the Legislature to enact laws "regulating the practice of courts of justice."3 4
The holding in the principal case is in accord with those in at
least four jurisdictions, 35 which hold that statutes making it manda-Hudgins v. Hall, 183 Va. 577, 584,

32 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1945).
'Va. Code Ann. § 30-5 (Repl. Vol. 1964). The right provided by this statute
has been jealously guarded by the General Assembly of Virginia. For example, see
Va. Code Ann. § 8-1.2 (Repl.. Vol. 1957). See also Hudgins v. Hall, supra note 27,
for the history of the consideration the statute has received from the General Assembly.
nHudgins v. Hall, 183 Va. 577, 583, 32 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1945).
"65 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1953).
3Fla. Stat. Ann. § 54.08 (1941).
3Fla. Const. art. 3, § 2.
"Fla. Const. art 3, § 2o. However, this does not seem to be particularly significant. In all eight jurisdictions which have raised the constitutional issue with
respect to continuance for attorney-legislators the courts recognize the power of the
legislature to enact statutes affecting pleading practice, and procedure. Letaw
v. Smith, 233 Ark. 638, 268 S.V.2d 3 (1954); Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n
155 Fla. 710, 21 So. 2d 6o5 (1954); Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen, 370
Ill. 523, 19 N.E.2d 363 (1939); Erwin v. Missouri & Kansas Tele. Co., 173 Mo. App.
508, 158 S.W. 913 (1913); Denton v. Hunt, 79 Okla. Crim. 166, 152 P.2d 698 (1944):
Bar Ass'n of Dallas v. Hexter Title & Abstract Co., 175 S.W.2d 1o8 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943); State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Board
of Supervisors, 197 Va. 130, 87 S.E.2d 799 (1955).
For a comprehensive treatment of the power of the judiciary to prescribe iules
of pleadings, practice, or procedure and the effect of legislative action in this 'rea,
see Annot., iio A.L.R. 22 (1937); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 705 (1945).
-Arkansas, Oklahoma, Illinois, and Missouri.
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tory on the court to grant continuances to attorney-legislators are unconstitutional. This appears to be the modern trend.
Arkansas and Oklahoma took the position, as did Vermont, that
mandatory continuance statutes destroy the principle of separation
of powers. In McConnell v. State36 the Supreme Court of Arkansas
concluded that the following language of the statute was too extreme,
"Proceedings shall be stayed in such pending suits without regard to
when, where, how or why any member of the General Assembly or
the aforesaid employees became employed or associated in the suit;
and, without regard to the number of other attorneys that may also
represent party litigants." 37 The court recognized the necessity of allowing lawyers to suspend their practice during legislative sessions, but
concluded that the statute deprived the courts of the power to determine a judicial question.
Language similar to that in the Arkansas statute was used in an
Oklahoma statute.38 In Booze v. District Court39 the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Oklahoma held that the statute infringed on a matter
which had been established in a long line of decisions as being in the
sole discretion of the court. The court said that "when the evidence
establishes that a motion for continuance is solely for the purpose of
40
delay and not made in good faith, it should be denied."
The statutes in Illinois 41 and Missouri 42 call for the granting of
continuances when it appears by affidavit that the presence of the
attorney-legislator is necessary for a fair and proper trial.4 3 Both
jurisdictions originally maintained that the affidavit need only state
that the attorney was a member and in actual attendance at a legislative session, and that his presence was necessary for a fair and proper
trial. Where the affidavit complied with the above statutory requirements, the court was precluded from making any determination of
whether the presence of the attorney was in fact necessary for a fair
and proper trial.4 4 Both jurisdictions subsequently decided such a
30227 Ark. 988, 302 S.W.2d 8o5 (957).
3Ark. Stat. § 37-1401, (Repl. Vol. 1962).
31Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 667 (1955).
'365 P.2d 589 (Okla. Grim. App. 1961).
'OId. at 593.
4ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 101.14 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
42Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.120 (1959).

"An earlier Texas Statute was worded substantially the same way. See Act ol
1929, 41st Leg., ch. 7, § ', at 17.
"Wicker v. Boynton, 93 11. 545 (1876); State v. Myers, 352 Mo. 735, 179 S.W.2d
72 (1944).
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construction would make the statutes unconstitutional. 45 In Johnson v.
Theodoron46 the Supreme Court of Illinois said, "The Legislature
does not have the power to declare what shall be conclusive evidence
of a fact...' nor can it say that a court is bound to act in accordance
with the opinion of a party to a suit, or of his attorney, expressed
in the form of an affidavit. '47 The court recognized the right of the
Legislature to establish by general law a cause for continuance, but
the court qualified this right by stating that it was for judicial determination whether the cause existed in a particular case. The Missouri
case of Kyger v. Koerpe 4s is in accord with this reasoning.49 The
Supreme Court of Missouri further emphasized that such legislation
would impose an unreasonable and unnecessary delay upon the administration of justice since that state has no limiting provision on
the length of legislative sessions. 50
It is submitted that the holding in the Granai case is consistent
with the constitutional concept of separation of powers. The granting
of a continuance clearly seems to be a matter for judicial discretion.
The Supreme Court of Vermont appears to adhere to the better view
in holding that the General Assembly in passing a statute which
clearly precludes any judicial discretion in the granting of a continuance trespassed on the constitutional power of the judiciary. Nevertheless, the decision seems to discriminate against the lawyer practicing alone in favor of the firm, which can usually put a man into court.
It would seem that the approach taken by Illinois and Missouri strikes
a more desirable balance between the conflicting interests involved.
The legislative branch should have the power to establish ground for
"Johnson v. Theodoron, 324 Ill. 543, 155 N.E. 481 (1927); Kyger v. Koerper.
355 Mo. 772, 774, 207 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1947).
'6324 Ill. 543, 155 N.E. 481 (1927).
'7Id. at 483.
'8355 Mo. 772, 774, 207 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1947).
'This decision is supported and further explained in Todd v. Stokes, 358
Mo. 452, 215 S-W.2d 464 (1948).
coIn State ex rel. Osborne v. Southern, 241 S.W.2d 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 1951), the
Kansas City Court of Appeals held that it was mandatory on the court to grant
a continuance where the application complied with the statute and further, that
the trial court could only determine if the application did comply with the statute.
In that case the application, supported by an affidavit, stated that the attorneylegislator was the relator's only counsel and that his attendance was necessary for
a fair and proper trial. This decision would appear to be consistent with the holding in the Kyger case in that the application alleged facts which would support a
finding that the presence of the attorney-legislator was necessary for a fair and proper trial.
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a continuance, but the court should have discretion to determine
from evidence before it whether cause exists in a particular case.
WILLIAM DYER ANDERSON

ACCOMPLICES TO ABORTIONS
Many jurisdictions, either because of statutes or the result of judicial decisions, will not sustain the conviction of the actual perpetrator of a crime solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice.' In these jurisdictions, therefore, it is important
2
to determine who is legally an accomplice.
Richmond v. Commonwealth,3 decided by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, raises the question in an abortion case. The girl's paramour
was the only witness possessing any knowledge of the abortion, aside
from the accused abortionist who did not testify. The boyfriend admitted responsibility for the girl's pregnancy. At the girl's request,
he arranged for a meeting with the abortionist and took her to the
designated meeting place. Following a brief private conversation
between the accused and the boyfriend, they all drove to the accused's trailer for the operation. The boyfriend remained in an adjoining room during the operation, after which the girl paid the accused. This operation proved unsuccessful, so a week later a second
operation was performed under similar circumstances. The girl, never
regaining consciousness, died as a result of the second operation.
The trial court left to the jury the question of whether the boyfriend was an accomplice of the abortionist so that the uncorroborated
testimony of the accomplice would not support a verdict of guilty.
The jury convicted. Upon appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeals held that the boyfriend was an accomplice as a matter of law.
Two judges dissented, being of the opinion that the rule requiring
iBiegun v. State, 2o6 Ga. 6M8, 58 S.E.2d 149 (1950); Fitch v. Commonwealth, 291
Ky. 748, 165 S.V.2d 558 (1942); State v. Sweeny, i8o Minn. 450, 231 N.W. 225 (193o);
see generally, 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2056 n.1o (3d ed. 1940); Note, 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 219, 233-237 (1954).
2

If the famous Rosenberg treason case had been tried in a New York state
court, where corroboration is required, a conviction would have been unlikely. Note,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 219, 234 (1954).
Where only a single witness is available to testify, the corroboration rule plesents the court with an unfortunate dilemma of choosing between what may appear
to be justice on one hand and the the state's legislative policy on the other.
337o S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1963).

